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Abstract—The technology race to achieve the position of an
economic leader is a phenomenon that has been taking place
all over the world. The 5G technology has become a vital
component of this race over the recent years. The technical
capabilities it offers and the role it may play in the economy
have become the subject of political debate and are at the
very core of the “war for technology” between two superpow-
ers: China and the United States. The European Union is
aware of the fact that the position Europe enjoys on the in-
ternational arena depends, to a large extent, on how quickly
European countries will develop and implement 5G. Are in-
dividual European member states capable of seamlessly im-
plementing the assumptions of strategies and plans concerned
with the development of 5th generation technologies? Will the
security of 5G networks be ensured in Europe? These are
just some of the issues that are analyzed in this article with
their economic and political context taken into consideration.
A broader perspective is presented, with primary focus on the
global geopolitical situation and on the conflict between China
and the United States. The study was conducted by relying
on an in-depth analysis of strategic state documents, reports
drawn up by institutions tasked with implementing and moni-
toring the development of 5G technology, as well as literature
on the subject and online resources.
Keywords—5G technology, cybersecurity, economy, Europe, mo-
bile networks, telecommunications.
1. Introduction
Europe, as well as the rest of the world, is currently imple-
menting fifth generation (5G) cellular technologies. After
its technical standards have been agreed upon, the solution
is now in the deployment and commercialization phase.
5G is a term that used to describe the fifth generation of
mobile network systems supporting mobile voice and data
transmission, with Internet access included [1].
5G is not a new concept. It is neither the first nor the last
generation of mobile networks. It is merely an update of the
technological solutions dating back to the early 1980s, first
having the form of analog mobile telephony (1G) and then
transformed, in 1991, into digital cellular telephony with
the added feature of short text messages (SMS) (2G). The
next step in the development process took place at the be-
ginning of the 21st century, when the third generation (3G)
telephony offering fast (by the then-standards) data trans-
mission and Internet access (from 14 to 28 Mb/s). Nearly
a decade later, in 2009, the 4G version enabled data to be
transferred with the speeds of up to 300 Mb/s. The 5G ver-
sion being implemented currently will not only speed up
the transmission of data by up to 60 times (up to 20 Gb/s),
but it will also support more devices per square kilometer
(up to 1 million for 5G, and up to 100,000 for 4G) and
will reduce transmission delays within the radio network
(from 50 ms in 4G to 1 ms in 5G) [2]. While 5G is a reg-
ular technological evolution, it is said to be a breakthrough
technology [3], since the qualitative change it brings does
not concern its technical capabilities, but the role that the
5G may play in the ecosystem of connected devices.
The strategic character of 5G networks may be one of the
reasons why this technology has become the cause of the
so-called cold war on tech [4] and the subject of informa-
tion warfare that is largely based on misinformation. For
the first time in the history of the telecommunications sec-
tor, communication technology has become the subject of
trade wars and geopolitical games conducted on such a wide
scale. Some researchers believe that the term “cold war on
tech” is abused in this context [5], as one of the conditions
for the cold war to be fought is the formation of blocks, and
these are not present here. However, one cannot fully agree
with this statement, and the entire political and economic
situation is much more complex and highly dynamic, as
discussed later in the article.
Along with the start of the public discussion on 5G, fueled
by disinformation activities, social protests are mounting in
Europe. Protesters demand a full ban on 5G technology,
and their actions are not limited to verbal objections, but
extend to destroying critical infrastructure, e.g. setting fire
to cellular masts.
The purpose of the article is to take a broader look at the
current situation related to the deployment of 5G in Poland
and in selected European countries. The analysis will focus
on two contexts: economic and political. Specific phenom-
ena related to 5G will be presented here, while a detailed
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description of its rollout in individual European countries
will not be provided. Examples pertaining to the individ-
ual countries are also relied upon to depict specific trends
that were not observed during the deployment of previous
generations of telecommunication technologies. The study
was conducted by relying on an in-depth analysis of strate-
gic state documents, reports drawn up by institutions tasked
with implementing and monitoring the development of 5G
technology, as well as literature on the subject and online
resources.
2. Literature Review
The review of literature on political and economic contexts
of implementing the 5G technology in Poland and in se-
lected European countries aims to present the current find-
ings in this area and to identify research limitations. Based
on current reports and literature, one may determine the
approach to this technology adopted by government agen-
cies and the practices they apply while implementing the
proposed strategies for regulating wireless connectivity in
the context of 5G. The outcomes of the review will identify
the results of the work performed in this field.
Because 5G is relatively new, there is little literature on
the implementation of the technology itself, especially with
an emphasis placed on the political and economic con-
text. Most of the papers are concerned with technical
issues [6]–[11]. These articles are dealing with the deploy-
ment of networks, compatibility, and other similar tech-
nical aspects. The authors of [12] have looked at 5G
in more detail and undertook an analysis of the techno-
logical change taking place and of its impact on the so-
ciety. Transition from 4G LTE to 5G is an archetypal
example of technological change. In their analysis, they
provide a complementary scenario-based assessment of 5G
infrastructure strategies in relation to mobile traffic growth
and potential development of the Internet of Things (IoT),
Smart Cities or other technology developments (services)
that rely on digital connectivity. The experience of the
United Kingdom, the Netherlands and India is given as an
example [13]–[15].
According to Fettweis and Alamouti [16], the 5G technol-
ogy is a critical step in the development of wireless con-
nectivity. The authors of [17] argue that 5G cellular com-
munications will be another paradigm shift redefining our
future and impacting our societies in ways which cannot be
foreseen. A Qualcomm report [17] describes the benefits of
5G and focuses on the commercial benefits achieved by im-
plementing this technology. As noted by the authors of the
report, this network standard will significantly expand the
potential of various spectra, and its high-band properties
will help increase capacity in various areas.
Additional information about the economic context of 5G
implementation is offered by a report drawn up by De-
loitte [18]. It describes the current competitive trends in
the market and the innovative networks that are necessary
for the transition from 4G to 5G. The increase in poten-
tial profits that wireless carriers may generate thanks to the
launch of the new system is a motivation to seek quick
implementation of the plan [18]. As a result, the pace of
the transition process may differ in individual countries and
the scope of the work that needs to be performed may be
different as well [19]. Therefore, a need arises to design
and introduce specific laws and regulations required to im-
plement 5G.
Some authors focus also on security-related aspects of
5G [20]. In recent years, many authors have been focus-
ing on Huawei and on China’s position in the technology
race (with particular emphasis placed on cybersecurity).
The authors of [21] are concerned with standardization and
examine China’s standard-related initiatives undertaken on
the international scene, perceiving these from the point of
view of techno-nationalism and of China’s specific interests
in Europe. In [22], Kowalski examines the Czechia–China
relations in the 2010s, focusing on the theoretical frame-
work of relationalism – an approach, adopted by the Czech
ruling and financial elite in an attempt to gain economic
benefits from the partnership with China. It is important to
know that Prague was selected as the center of European
operations of the powerful – at least until recently – CEFC
China Energy corporation.
As far as the economic and political context is concerned,
three articles are of particular importance. Lemstra [23]
asks the following question: “What explains the success
of 2G GSM and how can it be applied to create success
with 5G in the European Union?” In an attempt to answer
this question, the article presents two images of potential
5G futures, titled “evolution” and “revolution”, serving as
an input to the political debate on 5G leadership options.
These images reflect two extremes in terms of potential 5G
futures. Evolution follows the pattern of previous genera-
tions and current trends. Revolution clearly breaks away
from these trends and from the path to leadership with 5G,
as it leverages the power of standard APIs to build specific
services, enabling network virtualization as the architec-
tural backbone of 5G.
The problem of Chinese technological presence in Europe
is described by Kavalski in [24]. He concentrated his atten-
tion on CEE countries. Kavalski offers a brief overview of
the history of this relationship by focusing on the “17+1”
mechanism. The article asks whether there is anything
other than an instrumental economic justification for CEE
countries’ willingness to partner with China. This is also
one of the topics of this article. The problem of informa-
tion and trade war between the US and China is also raised
by Longtin [25]. Focusing on the geopolitical context, he
explores the innovation policies of Nokia and Huawei to
understand how the Chinese company was able become the
leader of that sector.
The number of publications on 5G is immense. However, it
is difficult to identify any papers focusing on political and
economic contexts of implementing the technology. Social,
technical and economic challenges related to 5G are de-
scribed by Pandey et al. [26], but in the context of India.
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Insights concerning the UAE are given by AlRaeesi and
Habibur [27] who describe the proactive approach to the
deployment of 5G. Its comparison with the European ap-
proach and the results achieved may be a very interesting
subject for future studies.
3. Political Context – Europe and
Member States
It is assumed in literature that the features of 5G networks
listed in the introduction, such as higher bandwidth, reduc-
tion of delays and increased number of connected devices
(up to 1 million per square kilometer), will contribute to
boosting competitiveness and innovative nature of the econ-
omy [28]. The use of sensor networks or autonomous ve-
hicles and robots will accelerate the adoption of Industry
4.0. 5G networks and the services offered based thereon
will make peoples’ lives easier. Uneven pace of and delays
in the deployment of these networks will create inequali-
ties and may result in digital re-exclusion of large areas of
Europe.
The deployment of 5G in Europe is based on two strate-
gic documents: 5G for Europe: An Action Plan and Con-
nectivity for a Competitive Digital Single Market: Towards
a European Gigabit Society [29]. In these documents, two
main objectives were adopted: enabling 5G connectivity as
a fully developed commercial service in at least one major
city by 2020, and uninterrupted and secure access to the 5G
network in all urban areas and on all major terrestrial trans-
port paths by 2025. 5G networks are to be developed in Eu-
rope by relying on the 700 MHz [30], 3400–3800 MHz [31]
and 26 GHz [32] frequency bands. According to European
Union documents, the Member States were to develop their
own strategic documents for the deployment of 5G net-
works.
According to the European 5G Observatory [33], despite
the recommendations of the European Commission, only
11 EU countries have published their national 5G devel-
opment strategies. These include: Austria, Germany, Italy
and Estonia. Some countries have also published national
broadband plans. In total, various forms of 5G deployment
plans were announced by 27 European countries (26 in the
EU and the United Kingdom).
In Poland, the National Broadband Plan [34] has been
drawn up and was amended by the government on.
March 10, 2020 the 5G Strategy for Poland that was made
available to the public for consultation in January 2018 was
to be another of the key documents, but the consultations
have not been completed as of the end of June 2020 and
the document has not been officially adopted [35]. These
documents are based, to a considerable extent, on their
European counterparts and on the goals, time frames and
tools set and developed for the deployment of 5G. Problems
with refarming the 700 MHz band for 5G systems that were
caused, inter alia, by the delay in concluding a cross-border
agreement with Russia [36] and by the need to adapt the
digital terrestrial television network [37] accordingly, re-
sulted in the postponement in issuing the applicable clear-
ance until the second half of 2020 [38]. Consultations
concerning the 3.4–3.8 GHz frequency band auction docu-
mentation were in progress until the end of February 2020.
Ultimately, the auction has been scheduled for March 7,
2020, but due to the COVID pandemic, it was postponed
and then canceled altogether. Confusion concerning the
3400–3800 MHz band auction delayed the Polish launch
of 5G services relying on those frequencies by at least six
months, despite the fact that all operators call for those
frequencies to be made available to them as soon as prac-
ticable [38].
To accelerate the deployment of 5G in Poland, it is imper-
ative that a tender or an auction be held and that bands
be made available. Legal regulations required to facili-
tate investment processes and construction of 5G network
infrastructure need to be passed as well. It was only at
the beginning of 2020 that standards setting the permissi-
ble electromagnetic field levels were adjusted to EU re-
quirements [39], [40]. Polish EMF standards in effect
previously were originally introduced in 1984 and were
based on Soviet Union specifications from an era when no
cellular networks existed. They were extremely restrictive
and contributed to slowing down the expansion of 4G net-
works [41].
The specific traits of 5G networks deployed in urban en-
vironments require the installation of a dense network of
small transmitters (3.4–3.8 GHz or 26 GHz). Therefore,
in order to offer 5G coverage in urban areas, it is nec-
essary to install a great number of small antennas on ur-
ban infrastructure (buildings, road signs, power line posts,
etc.) [41, p. 35]. On June 30, 2020, the European Com-
mission adopted an Implementing Regulation on small-
area wireless access points or small antennas, ordering
the installation of such small base stations in all member
states based on a permit-exempt deployment regime [42].
In Poland, under the Act on supporting the development of
telecommunications networks and services, the obligation
to obtain a building permit has been partially abolished and
replaced with an obligation to notify given project. Fees
due for access to vertical infrastructure have been waived
as well [41, p. 36]. At the same time, however, the Min-
istry of Environment listed base stations as undertakings
that may exert a significant impact on the environment,
thus doing away with the facilitating measures introduced
previously [43]. According to the Polish Chamber of Infor-
mation Technology and Telecommunications (PIIT) and the
Polish Chamber of Commerce for Electronics and Telecom-
munications, this will definitely hinder the construction of
5G networks. Regulation of the Minister of Digitization on
the minimum technical and organizational measures and
methods that telecom companies are required to adopt to
ensure the security or integrity of networks or services, will
enter into effect by the end of the year [44]. The said Reg-
ulation requires operators rendering 5G services to comply
with 5G cybersecurity standards related, inter alia, to threat
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identification and prevention mechanisms. It also ensures
competition between suppliers and calls for conducting se-
curity audits. Regardless of the said Regulation, special
requirements will also be laid out in the decisions pursuant
to which right to use the 3400–3800 MHz band will be
awarded in an auction or a tender, but the wording of these
requirements still remains unknown.
4. Economic Context. Development of
Commercial 5G Networks
As far as the technology relied upon in designing 5G net-
works and user terminals is concerned, one may state that
its implementation is already underway in Europe. How-
ever, contrary to previous predictions by experts, it is not
the industrial sector, but users of high-speed Internet who
have turned out to be the first customer group. The search
for European “unicorns” harnessing the potential of 5G net-
works is still ahead of us.
The first 5G smartphones were introduced in Europe in
the second and third quarter of 2019. The first commer-
cial deployments focus on offering enhanced mobile broad-
band (eMBB) services, with increased bitrate for data trans-
mission customers. Solutions involving a significant reduc-
tion in delays, ultra reliable low-latency communication
(URLLC), and an increased number of devices (massive
IoT) have not yet been implemented commercially.
By the end of March 2020, 5G commercial services were
deployed in 10 countries: Austria, Finland, Germany, Hun-
gary, Ireland, Italy, Latvia, Romania, Spain and the United
Kingdom [45]. Tests are still underway in other EU coun-
tries. By the end of 2019, over 181 tests were announced,
and 5G networks were launched commercially in 130 EU
cities. So far, Italy, Germany, France, Spain and the United
Kingdom have conducted the highest number of tests in
Europe.
In Poland, due to administrative delays in making the har-
monized European spectrum available to operators (caused
by the reasons described in the part of the paper dealing
with the political context), the implementation of the first
commercial 5G services, forced by commercial demand and
strong competition among Polish operators, occurs with the
use of frequencies other than those comprising the Euro-
pean harmonized bands. Polkomtel has launched a com-
mercial service using the 2.6 GHz band, with Play and
T-Mobile Polska relying on the 2.1 GHz band. Orange Pol-
ska announced that these services would be launched in
July 2020, under reserve that this deadline may be post-
poned to the end of the year [46].
As far as tests of the 5G technology relying on the EU-
wide harmonized bands are concerned, the first tests of
5G networks operating in urban areas were performed in
September 2018 by Orange Polska [47]. In June 2019,
another mobile operator, Play, cooperating with the Office
of Electronic Communications, Łódź University of Tech-
nology, Ericsson and the Łódź Special Economic Zone,
signed an agreement to join the S5 – Akcelerator pilot pro-
gramm. It aims to foster innovative solutions relying on
5G technology [47]. Therefore, Łódź has become Poland’s
first city mentioned in the 5G for Poland Strategy to pi-
lot the solution. 5G devices have already been tested by
T-Mobile and Polkomtel as well. The aforementioned tests
are of technical nature and are subject to restrictive territo-
rial limitations, with the services offered not being available
commercially. Unlike in many other EU countries, no re-
search or development programs concerning 5G tests and
pilots promoting the technology (i.e. identifying economic
unicorns and innovative services) have been conducted or
established in Poland.
The cost of investing in 5G networks is huge, and the ex-
penditures may be even higher due to reckless regulatory
decisions taken in light of the trade war discussed below.
Therefore, profitability may only be ensured by finding
users who, by offering innovative services for industry or
agriculture, will foster demand for telecom services that are
more expensive than telephony or regular (even fast) Inter-
net access. Simultaneously, it is important to ensure that
the cost of building these networks remains as low as pos-
sible. These barriers in Poland were to be resolved by the
Polish 5G agreement [48] proposed in 2019 at the initiative
of Exatel, the Polish Development Fund Group and four op-
erators: Orange Polska, T-Mobile Polska, Polkomtel, and
Play. Its goal was to create a business (wholesale) model for
building a common infrastructure for the 700 MHz band.
The state would have a majority shareholding in the project
and would contribute the 700 MHz frequency band, while
the operators would make passive infrastructure and finan-
cial contributions [49]. However, no specific solutions have
been reached so far.
On the other hand, research programs have been introduced
by governments of other countries: willing to stimulate the
country’s economic growth, the UK government allocated
200 million pounds for testbeds and trials of new applica-
tions [50], Germany provided 26 million euros in funding
to support three research projects focusing on cities, the
medical sector and university campuses [51]. The Czech
government also organized a competition for cities that
are eligible to obtain. 2 million Czech crowns for test-
ing their 5G networks [52]. The authorities of Vienna
came up with a city-led initiative allocating 20 million eu-
ros to the development of the 5G network in the Austrian
capital [53].
Some governments have set up special organizations, such
as Invest in Finland – an entity operating in Nokia’s moth-
erland [54]. It is a government organization dedicated to
financing innovation and promoting trade, travel, and in-
vestment. One of its goals is to implement “communication
of the future” systems. It was the Finnish mobile opera-
tor Elisa [55] that launched the world’s first 5G network.
Hungary implemented an interesting solution by launch-
ing the 5GC project – the Hungarian 5G Coalition (5GK
– Magyarországi 5G Koalíció) [56], comprising represen-
tatives of the government, market players, and academia
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members. Its purpose is to plan and coordinate the im-
plementation of the network in Hungary. Thanks to this
initiative, Hungary has become one of the first European
centers for 5G development (alongside Austria, Germany
and Estonia). The first switchboard in Hungary was com-
missioned in July 2018 at the Magyar Telekom headquarters
in Budapest [57].
All European countries need to invest in constructing 5G
networks die to two reasons: economic competitiveness and
citizens’ access to next-generation digital services. Such in-
vestments will also translate directly into attracting modern,
technologically-advanced projects, i.e. the so-called Indus-
try 4.0, thus increasing the number of jobs on the market.
According to the European Commission, 5G networks will
be one of the most important components of the digital
economy in the next decade. It is estimated that global rev-
enues related to the development of 5G-based services will
amount to 225 billion euros in 2025 [28, p. 21]. With such
data taken into consideration, the trade war on tech fought
by the world’s superpowers is of great financial significance
as well.
5. Network Security in the Context of
a Global Conflict of Superpowers
The projected economic and geopolitical importance of 5G
results in many countries paying close attention to the op-
tion of interfering with the free market and the freedom of
economic activity by introducing specific rules to ensure
the security of 5G networks [58]. So far, operators have
been enjoying full independence in choosing suppliers of
their network components, remaining responsible for the
security of their networks and for, ensuring confidentiality
or compliance with regulations set forth in the General Data
Protection Regulation (GDPR). The initial lack of specific
European regulations regarding 5G networks resulted in the
approaches taken by different countries not being uniform.
Consequently, due to its economic dependence, Europe has
become a venue of a direct “trade war on tech” between
the US and China. As a result, network security has be-
come a part of the political agendas of European countries
deliberating their economic interventions policies.
Globally, the most controversial steps (justified by the need
to ensure the security of the network and of the economy),
were taken by the US. By means of an executive order,
the country banned the use of telecommunications equip-
ment manufactured by companies recognized as a threat
to the national security [59]. The order concerned mainly
manufacturers from China, as it was this country that was
identified as a “strategic competitor” in the US national
security strategy [60].
China is developing the so-called Digital Silk Road (DSR).
The project assumes that undertakings in the field of tech-
nology, 5G networks and e-commerce will be implemented
in cooperation with selected countries. The goal of DSR
is to promote China’s own technology standards. The ri-
valry with the U.S. and the importance of the digital sector
during the COVID-19 pandemic have exerted even more
pressure on China [61].
Huawei Technologies, a Chinese company founded in Shen-
zhen in 1987, is at the very center of the dispute. It is one
of the leaders in the 5G technology market, is present in
170 countries around the world and has been active on
the European market since 2000. The controversy around
the company stems, inter alia, from the escalating dispute
between the US administration and China. Both of these
countries are engaged in growing competition for global
technology leadership. The US has made multiple allega-
tions against the Chinese tech tycoon, accusing it of steal-
ing trade secrets of American companies, violating interna-
tional bans and supplying Iran with equipment that allowed
it to monitor anti-government demonstrations in Tehran in
2009, and of attempting to conceal Huawei’s business ex-
changes with North Korea, taking place despite the eco-
nomic sanctions imposed on this country [62]. Allegations
of corporate espionage have been made as well [63]. The
company disputes the said allegations, while the Chinese
Foreign Ministry accuses the US government of “economic
bullying behavior” and of misusing security issues to “sup-
press Chinese enterprises with unwarranted charges” [63].
In addition, Huawei filed a lawsuit in New Orleans in De-
cember 2019 challenging a recent FCC decision that pro-
hibits U.S. operators from using federal subsidies to pur-
chase Huawei equipment [64]. At the same time, the US
calls on other allied countries to boycott the implementa-
tion of Huawei’s 5G technology, using NATO structures for
this purpose as well [65].
In Europe, attitudes toward this technology war vary from
one country to another. At the initial phase of the net-
work security debate, Washington secured the support of
Romania, Poland, Estonia, Latvia, and the Czech Republic,
all of which signed joint 5G security statements or memo-
randums with the US government [66]–[70] declaring their
intention to provide access to their 5G networks to “trusted
suppliers” only. The statements themselves, however, are
of little value. They must be backed up by laws forcing
telecom companies to abide by their terms. In Poland, the
government fast-tracked regulations on 5G security, cancel-
ing the 5G spectrum auction that was already in progress
and demanding the telecommunications market regulator
(President of the Office of Electronic Communications) to
include specific obligations in the terms of the repeated auc-
tion [71]. As of the end of June 2020, this has only resulted
in delaying the process of making the 3400–3800 MHz
spectrum band available to Polish 5G layers by at least
six months.
The Estonian Parliament passed amendments to the Elec-
tronic Communications Act, requiring operators to coor-
dinate with the national communications authority on 5G
deployment [72]. This means that national security and in-
telligence agencies will be able to interfere in the process by
imposing restrictions on supplier selection. The Czech Re-
public turned out to be a strong European supporter of the
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American approach, relying on the Prague principles [73]
that have allowed to reach a Western consensus on Chinese
suppliers [74].
The German government is skeptical of Washington’s al-
legations against Huawei. German operators (Deutsche
Telekom and Vodafone) operate 4G networks that rely (to
over 50%) on Huawei hardware [74]. Germany also fears
that a ban on purchasing equipment from Chinese suppliers
will seriously damage its economic ties with China – the
country’s largest trade partner. Deutsche Telekom has pre-
sented an analysis in which the exclusion of Huawei from
the 5G market is labeled as the “Armageddon scenario” ex-
pected to generate additional 3 billion euros in costs [75].
Discussions are ongoing, however. Under the pressure of
the parliament and Angela Merkel’s smaller coalition part-
ners, the German Federal Ministry of the Interior proposed,
in May 2020, a draft law [76] that would enhance the se-
curity requirements binding upon 5G providers, simulta-
neously providing the ministry with new powers to block
non-trusted suppliers. It remains known how the govern-
ment plans to assess the trustworthiness of suppliers, as
unspecified certification mechanisms are being considered.
France has adopted a different approach, as it has attempted
to assume a leading role in 5G security in Europe. National
security checks were carried out in the country, focusing
on cybersecurity policies in effect at the individual oper-
ators, as well as on their suppliers choices. In 2019, the
government, operating via the Cybersecurity Agency, was
authorized to block base stations (RAN) used by service
providers if their operation would pose a threat to national
security. The said right was added to the package of reg-
ulations binding upon telecom companies [74]. The entire
telecommunications infrastructure has been recognized as
being of critical importance for the state – an approach
that paves the way for deep interference with economic
freedoms. However, no final decisions to exclude Huawei
from the process of building 5G in France have been made
so far. The Chinese are trying to influence the decision-
making process in Paris by promising to invest millions
in constructing Europe’s largest manufacturing base [77].
However, the outbreak of the pandemic has put that pro-
cess on halt.
The decisions of Italy, Belgium and the Netherlands also
seem to be important for both the US and China. In 2019,
the government of Italy – the EU’s third largest economy
– adopted Legislative Decree No. 64/2019 (DL 64/2019),
which amends the law known as the Golden Power Legis-
lation (Legislazione sul potere d’oro), governing the state’s
powers to intervene in transactions involving enterprises
operating in the defense, national security, communica-
tions, energy and transport sectors (“strategic sectors”) [78].
The change allows the government to block contracts be-
tween operators and equipment suppliers [79]. At the end
of 2019, new cybersecurity “perimeter” regulations were
passed, which would impose new requirements on telecom-
munications and IT services used in “strategic sectors” [80].
The government is now finalizing the list of enterprises,
sectors and government organizations that would be sub-
ject to the stricter regime.
Belgium is a strategic country, as it is a host for the NATO
headquarters and the key EU institutions. The country’s in-
telligence services have recommended the government to
limit the use of “non-trusted suppliers”. The administra-
tion is working on law amendments that are to restrict the
participation of Chinese suppliers, at least in the so-called
“core” of the network [81].
The Dutch government, traditionally close to the US in re-
gards to cybersecurity and intelligence, also adopted a new
law in December 2019 [82]. It allows to ban the sales of
goods if there is a suspicion that they may sabotage the
telecoms network, or that their suppliers have close ties
with or legal obligations towards foreign governments that
could pose a security threat. The Netherlands has previ-
ously indicated that this means a ban on the use of equip-
ment from high-risk suppliers in the so-called “core” of the
network [74].
Those European countries which are undecided, with their
governments continuing to consult telecom companies, in-
telligence services and market regulators on the proposed
legal amendments that would eliminate high-risk suppliers,
continues to prevail as of mid-2020. These include, inter
alia, Spain, Portugal, Luxembourg, Sweden, Austria, and
Finland.
The Spanish economy minister announced, in February
2020, that she was working on legal acts regulating net-
work security issues. However, the COVID-19 epidemic
caused delays in legislative work and the spectrum auc-
tion was postponed to a later date [83]. At the same time,
Spain’s largest operator, Telefónica, declared that it would
reduce the share of Huawei’s equipment in the modernized
networks, but would continue to use it nonetheless. The
second largest operator, Orange, confirmed its cooperation
with ZTE, Huawei and Ericsson on the Spanish market [84].
It seems that Spain has adopted a liberal approach focus-
ing on the overriding goal of development and mass-scale
deployment of 5G [28].
The above was confirmed on the 10th of October 2020, dur-
ing the XXXI Spanish-Portuguese summit. Spanish Prime
Minister Pedro Sanchez announced that Telefonica guaran-
teed that 5G coverage in Spain would reach 75% by the end
of 2020. This will be done in cooperation with Huawei,
although he did not exclude the possibility of cooperating
with “other foreign entrepreneurs”. Moreover, the govern-
ments of both countries announced the adoption of a “Joint
Cross-Border Development Strategy”. They also planned
to work on specific infrastructure projects, with the con-
struction of AVE (high-speed rail) between Madrid-Lisbon
and the implementation of a new 5G technology reality,
known as “Atlantic Corridor”, being the most important of
them [85].
No final decisions have been made by Sweden (the home
of Huawei’s European competitor – Ericsson) and Finland
(the home of another European competitor – Nokia) [86].
In Finland, Huawei equipment is widely used in 4G net-
works. At the same time, the US – a country which is
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falling behind in 5G and does not have any domestic suppli-
ers offering 5G networks, is considering purchasing shares
in Ericsson and Nokia through its economic tycoons, such
as Cisco or Google [87]. Simultaneously, American com-
panies, such as AT&T, Dell, Microsoft, Intel and Infineon,
closely support the development of the Open RAN stan-
dard. Korea’s Samsung and China’s ZTE are also involved
in the work on that standard, and the participating oper-
ators include also China Mobile, Deutsche Telekom, and
Orange [88]. However, this solution is not ready yet. The
work is ongoing and it its results will most likely be har-
nessed while focusing on the 6G network in 5 to 10 years’
time.
An approach similar to that taken by the French (but only in
the field of 5G) is considered by Denmark which is prepar-
ing legislations classifying the entire 5G network as critical
infrastructure [89]. As a result, China, referring to the vi-
olation of the GATT Free Trade Agreement, threatened to
terminate a free trade agreement between the Faroe Islands
(an autonomous part of Denmark) and China if Denmark
failed to sign the 5G agreement with Huawei [90].
After initial hesitation, Great Britain joined the coalition
with the United States and proposed an alliance of 10
countries to reduce reliance on China in the process of
introducing 5G technology [91]. Such an alliance would
be made up of Australia, South Korea, India and the
G7 countries (France, Japan, Germany, USA, UK, Italy,
and Canada). The initiative is a result of concerns about
Huawei’s and ZTE’s domination in the process of deploying
5G in Europe. Interestingly, the UK government previously
approved Huawei’s participation in the construction of the
5G network in the country, but at the same time imposed
a cap of 35% on Huawei equipment’s market share [92].
As far as European countries open to all 5G equipment sup-
pliers are concerned, one may list Austria whose chancellor
has publicly announced that his country is “fundamentally
technologically neutral” and does not intend to succumb
to US pressure in the area of excluding Huawei from 5G
deployment [93]. The prime ministers of Slovakia [94] and
Hungary [95] adopted a similar attitude.
The president of Russia has assumed a strong stance with
this regard. The deal between the Russian company of Mo-
bile TeleSystems and Huawei, concerning the deployment
of the 5G network, was signed in an almost ceremonial
manner, in the presence of the presidents of China and
Russia. According to CNN, “Russia does not share the US
security concerns and even suggests that the deal is a try-on
for an internet iron curtain” [96]. This stance shows that
the notion of a cold war on tech [97] has some justifica-
tion, although not everyone agrees. Kaan Sahin claims [98]
that one of the conditions for the Cold War to come into
existence is the emergence of blocks, as it was the case
in the second half of the 20th century. According to him,
these are absent in this trade war. However, the US ad-
ministration’s policy of polarization and the emergence of
a Chinese-Russian block seem to contradict this optimistic
assumption. On the worldwide scene, Australia has also in-
troduced a ban on the use of Chinese equipment in 5G net-
works. The division into countries supporting the US and
defending themselves against pressure to eliminate Huawei
from the market becomes ever more apparent in Europe as
well.
We shall see, in the coming years, whether such a division
will be gaining in importance, considering the fact that
the world is moving towards disintegration of the Internet
(China, Russia, Iran, etc.). Will the division of the Internet
into separated and filtered regional blocks result in the di-
vision of technology providers serving separate regions? It
seems that such a thought is becoming ever more prevailing
among the important politicians of the superpowers. But
does it make any sense? To judge this, one needs to take
a step back in their considerations and look at security from
the technical perspective.
6. Conclusions
The article reviews the current situation related to the de-
ployment of 5G in Poland and in some other European
countries. The rollout of 5G in Europe has been set in
an economic and political context, and is presented from
a broader point of view, with the global geopolitical situa-
tion and the conflict between China and the US taken into
consideration. 5G-related phenomena, such as deployment
delays observed in some European countries, are also pre-
sented. Examples of specific European countries were like-
wise used to present trends that were non-existent during
the implementation of previous generations of telecommu-
nication technologies.
After a critical analysis of reports drawn up by institutions
monitoring the development of 5G, as well as strategic doc-
uments of the individual states, literature of the subject
and online sources, one may conclude that two main rea-
sons exist as to why investment projects concerned with the
construction of 5G networks in Europe are of such great
importance. The first of those reasons is Europe’s desire
to ensure its economic competitiveness in its relations with
the rest of the world. The other is the citizens’ access to
next-generation digital services. These two aspects are di-
rectly related to the global desire to take advantage of the
benefits offered by Industry 4.0 – a phenomenon that is
most likely to boost economic growth and create new jobs.
Europe’s position on the international arena depends on
how quickly European countries will develop and deploy
5G. Each country pursues its own economic policy and
struggles with other internal problems, meaning that the
progress in developing and deploying 5G networks may
not be even in different European states.
Network security is also crucial, especially in the context
of the global conflict between two superpowers (US and
China) over dominance in the deployment of 5G. Due to
China racing ahead and the US lagging behind, this conflict
is escalating to other countries, including those in Europe.
The pressure to exclude the Chinese company of Huawei
from the market, exerted by the US, has resulted in di-
visions, also in the European Union. The dependency of
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specific countries on a single 5G vendor will result in the
lack of diversity in the area of devices and solutions used.
Consequently, the pace of innovation may slow down both
at national and European level (in the absence of competi-
tion), and the 5G infrastructure may become more vulner-
able from the security point of view, especially if multiple
operators rely on one vendor only. Such a supplier may
come under commercial pressure, be sanctioned, or simply
fail commercially. Another key point is that a limited num-
ber of vendors may lower the market incentive to develop
more secure products. It is not clear whether this higher fi-
nancial cost will result in greater security, as China will not
be eliminated from the supply chain of European producers
within the next decade.
5G will be crucial in the context of ensuring economic
growth of European countries. At the same time, it is also
an element of political discussions centered around tech-
nological security, the “war on tech” and information war-
fare, fueled by disinformation. Therefore, social protests
are mounting, also in Europe, demanding a total ban on
5G. The protests are not limited, in an increasing number
of cases, to verbal dissatisfaction, involve but also destruc-
tion of critical infrastructure. In recent months, Europe
has witnessed a wave of antenna towers being set on fire.
Unfortunately, in mid-2020, in its documents serving as
a foundation for the rollout of 5G in Europe, the European
Commission failed to elaborate on how to win social ac-
ceptance for 5G and did not propose any actions aimed at
expanding the technical knowledge of European societies.
This lack of social acceptance, caused mostly by ignorance
and fear, could affect the pace of 5G development, thus
slowing down Europe’s economic growth and depriving it
of its position in the international economic race.
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